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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDIOVISUAL REGULATION
INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE TELEVISION




In early January of 2002, Jean-Marie Messier, the chief executive of French
audiovisual giant Vivendi Universal, held a press conference to discuss his
company's latest acquisition: American-based USA Network's media business.'
During the conference, a French journalist asked Messier whether this latest $10.8
billion purchase marked a shift toward the Americanization of French cinema.
2
While the answer to the question is debatable, Messier's response undoubtedly
marks a shift in the attitude of the private audiovisual sector in France, and perhaps
in the European Union as a whole. "The Franco-French cultural exception is
dead," he declared, referring to the notion that media product is cultural product,
and thus must be dealt with differently than other trade goods.3 The response was
an immediate and overwhelming criticism of Messier and the initiation of an
investigation, by France's highest administrative court, of Vivendi's shareholder
* The author is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A., English
Literature, 2000, University of Colorado at Boulder, summa cum laude. I would like to thank Tamra
Griffin as well as the staff of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
I. See generally, Jo Johnson, Defenders of French Culture Rally to Attack Vivendi Chief-
Remarks by Jean Marie-Messier Have Renewed Fears About an Americanisation of French Cinema,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2002; The French Cultural Exception is Dead-Is It?, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 15, 2002; James Harding & Jo Johnson, Messier Gambles on a Showdown: The Vivendi
Chiefs Decision to Sack the Chairman of Canal Plus Leaves Him Badly Exposed in France, FIN. TIMES
(London), April 17, 2002; James Harding & Jo Johnson, Vivendi's ego left facing fall-out from dual
sacking: Unions Denounce Messier, Cultural Icons May Follow Suit and Investors May Seek Brakes on
Chief Executive Over His Management Style, FIN. TIMES (London), April 17, 2002.
2. James Harding & Jo Johnson, Messier Gambles on a Showdown: The Vivendi Chiefs
Decision to Sack the Chairman of Canal Plus Leaves Him Badly Exposed in France, FIN. TIMES
(London), April 17, 2002.
3. A continuing source of conflict between the European Union and the United States has been
whether audiovisual products are goods (the U.S. view) or, particularly in the broadcasting context,
services (the E.U. view). See Jo Johnson, Defenders of French Culture Rally to Attack Vivendi Chief:
Remarks by Jean Marie-Messier Have Renewed Fears About an Americanisation of French Cinema,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2002, supra note 1.
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register to determine whether Vivendi's Pay-TV arm, Canal Plus, was more than
20 percent owned by non-European Union shareholders.4 After a turbulent summer
at the helm of Vivendi, Messier stepped down under fierce criticism in early July.5
The drama may be lost on American film and television consumers. The
American audiovisual industry has long enjoyed a position of dominance in the
global market which has, in many respects, insulated American consumers from
the kind of conditions inside the French and broader European markets that have
resulted in a sort of audiovisual dysfunction amongst the family of European
Union regulatory policies and Member State practices. The patriarch of this
family, the Television Without Frontiers Directive 6 (the "Directive") is under
renewed scrutiny from the Commission which, in November of 2002, published a
five-year evaluation of the Directive's effectiveness 7 expected to stimulate a new
debate in the coming months on possible amendments to the law.8 Messier's bell-
tolling episode and the resulting political fallout in many ways encapsulates the
underlying issues for audiovisual regulation inside the European Union. The
French view of media as culture is in no way aberrant; it is pervasive throughout
the European Union. 9 On the other hand, the United States, whose audiovisual
industry earned over $530 billion in 2001 (more than 5 percent of the U.S. GDP)
and exported $90 billion in audiovisual product overseas in the same year,'0 has
consistently argued that while media products have a cultural component, they
should be treated as goods rather than services for purposes of trade law." This
position is at odds with the Directive, which requires, among its other provisions,"
quotas for the broadcasting of European programming and independent European
production' 3-- quotas which would clearly be illegal under the General Agreement
4. See The French Cultural Exception is Dead-Is I0, supra note I.
5. In April of 2002, Messier fired Canal's chairman, Pierre Lescure, which led to even greater
political fallout and placed Messier under fire from both shareholders and government officials. See
Messier Gambles on a Showdown, supra note 1; See also Andrea R. Vaucher, Messier: Yanks for the
Memories, VARIETY, July 15, 2002, at 6; Meredith Amdur, Titan or Outcast? It's all in the Timing,
VARIETY, July 22, 2002, at 7.
6. Council Directive 89/552/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23. [hereinafter the Directive].
7. Fifth Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the Application of Articles Four and Five of Directive 89/552/EEC, "Television Without Frontiers," as
amended by Directive 97/36/EC, for the Period 1999-2000, COM(2002)612 final. [hereinafter the
November Report of the Commission].
8. See Ian Hargreaves, The Threat to Democracy: European Media Regulation is a Muddle, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 21, 2002 [hereinafter The Threat to Democracy]; Ian Hargreaves, The Media and
the Euro, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12, 2002; Dawn Haynes, A Closer Watch on all Channels:
MEDIA: the European Commission's Review of the Directive on Television May Seek to Extend the
Law to all Kinds of Networks, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2002 [hereinafter A Closer Watch on all
Channels].
9. See Lisa L. Garrett, Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle Between the United States and the
European Union Over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 553, 555 (1994)
[hereinafter Commerce Versus Culture].
10. See Pam McClintock, Creative Cargo, VARIETY, Apr. 29,2002, at 9.
I1. See Commerce Versus Culture, supra note 9 at 563.
12. The Directive also contains broad provisions for the regulation of advertising (Chapter IV) and
for the protection of minors (Chapter V), subjects which are beyond the scope of this paper.
13. See The Directive, supra note 6 at arts. 4-6.
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on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
14
But in the wake of the Commission's five-year report, both the effectiveness
and the purpose of the Directive are being questioned not just by the U.S.
audiovisual industry, but by those inside the European Union as well.' 5 Messier's
position embodies concerns within the European Union that liberalization of
audiovisual regulatory policies is necessary in order to develop a more competitive
European audiovisual sector. With the collapse of the public broadcasting model
across much of Europe (including France) and its gradual replacement by
commercial and pay-TV networks broadcasting a large quantity of American
programming suffused with American culture, it seems likely that in order to
address the cultural concerns embodied in the Directive, a more competitive
European audiovisual industry is needed. One viewpoint is that the audiovisual
sector need only be nurtured under European Union regulation in order for it to
become more competitive.1 6 Another is that liberalization is the only way to
compete. 17
This is, essentially, the question the European Union must now resolve:
whether protection of European culture is best accomplished by strengthening the
Directive or by liberalizing regulation. The last proposals to amend the Directive
in 1996 ultimately failed to shore up the loopholes its critics complain make it
ineffective. Quota provisions were kept at a mandatory 50 percent rather than
increased as some member states had called for, a proposal to eliminate the "where
practicable" clause from article four was rejected, leaving implementation of the
quotas themselves arguably non-mandatory, and an exception for sporting events,
news, and games was retained, thus effectively allowing broadcasters to continue
satisfying their quota requirements by broadcasting fare with, what some have
argued, is relatively little cultural worth. '8
Despite the implementation of the Directive, it seems that whatever threat to
European culture lurked in American audiovisual sector in the mid 1980's is still
there. Indeed, as media consumption inside the European Union has continued to
grow, the only question seems to be in what form will American dominance of
film and television next manifest itself. Given this dominance, how can the
European audiovisual sector hope to remain a viable cultural force? One of the
emerging threats to the effectiveness of the Directive-and if the preamble to the
Directive is to be taken at face value, to European culture itself-is exhibited in the
Vivindi-Universal fiasco of the past summer: the emergence of what Ian
Hargreaves has called an "oligopoly of global media companies, based upon the
14. GATT applies only to trade in goods rather than services. For an excellent discussion of the
history of GATT and the Television Without Frontiers Directive, see Commerce Versus Culture, supra
note 9 at 553.
i5. See generally, id.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Kevin M. McDonald, How Would You Like Your Television: With or Without
Borders and With or Without Culture-a New Approach to Media Regulation in the European Union,
22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1991 (1999) [hereinafter How Would You Like Your Television].
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American entertainment industry."' 19
Another threat is posed by the rapid development of new technologies not
envisioned by the 1989 law. Television on demand, satellite broadcasting, and
webcasting all threaten to eviscerate the meaningfulness of television broadcast
quotas as these forms of media consumption compete more and more with
traditional broadcasting. 20 The Commission is now considering two possible
approaches to the technology problem: one is to simply keep the law confined to
traditional television broadcasting and update various provisions such as the
"where practicable" language of article four, the other is to recast the Directive so
that it applies to all broadcast technologies.
2'
Regardless of the Commission's recommendations, it is questionable whether
the Directive can ever be effective. The market forces that are leading to the
conglomeration of media companies in both the United States and the European
Union cannot be effectively addressed by broadcasting legislation alone. Indeed, it
is not clear that they should be. Furthermore, if the Commission recommends
confining the Directive to the traditional television market, it is unclear that it can
remain an effective tool for cultural preservation while the consumption of other
forms of media-much of it dominated by non-EU culture-becomes more and
more prevalent. Even if the Directive were overhauled to apply to novel media
markets, and even if the new regulations go beyond the loopholes of the current
law to create a truly effective regulatory scheme, it is doubtful that the legislative
process can keep pace with technological development in the future. Furthermore,
given the broad range of regulatory bodies which will have the task of
implementing the directive inside individual member states, the dysfunction is
likely to continue.22 In short, the Directive may be a failed proposition.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE AMERICAN POISON.
To appreciate the current situation, one must consider the circumstances
leading to the implementation of the Directive in the mid and late 1980's. It was
during this period that the "American cultural threat" developed; American media
exports, particularly television exports, now began to appear frequently in Europe.
Many countries in Europe still had no experience with commercial broadcasting,
having initiated and operated their television broadcasting services under a public
model, and were wary of American style commercialism. 23 In many ways, the
19. See Ian Hargreaves, The Threat to Democracy, supra note 8.
20. See Dawn Haynes, A Closer Watch on all Channels, supra note 8.
21. Id.
22. Some member states, such as the United Kingdom, maintain a single regulatory body (the
Office of Communications Regulation, or Ofcom, in the case of the U.K.) tasked with enforcing media
regulations like the Directive, while others use a range of regulatory bodies. The argument on the one
hand is that a central body is more efficient and therefore more effective. On the other hand, countries
employing several regulatory bodies argue that it is easier to insulate the regulators from political
influence by disbursing their responsibilities. See Ian Hargreaves, The Threat to Democracy, supra
note 8.
23. See generally, KERRY SEGRAVE, AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD: HOLLYWOOD'S ATrEMPT
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1980's became a coming of age era for commercial television in Europe. In
Germany, the ZDF network was essentially forced to purchase cheap American
programming-despite its assertion that German viewers preferred other fare-as
a budget reduction coupled with inflationary woes forced the broadcaster to fill its
air-time with American re-runs and feature films.2 4  This scenario became
increasingly common throughout the European Economic Community.
25
In France, the chorus of voices objecting to American media imperialism was
just beginning to organize. In 1981, The Committee for National Identity placed
an ad in Le Monde advocating that a pre-existing 50 percent quota for French films
on television be raised to 60 percent.26  Later that year, French Film director
Gerard Blain characterized American media products as "the American Poison,"
and asserted "it is by films made in Hollywood that America infuses its venom into
the spirits of people, that it insidiously but deeply imposes its stereotypes and
literally saps their life force. 27 In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a trend
toward the liberalization of regulatory policies was beginning. Richard Collins has
observed, "for the most part, the U.K.'s European audiovisual policy has been
conspicuous by its absence. '28 British officials often seemed to see the problem
not as one of cultural imperialism on the part of the United States, but as one of
ineffective competition or unassertiveness on the part of the U.K.'s audiovisual
sector. "Why do we pay the Americans to show their TV schlock when they could
be asked to pay to air ours?" asked British television executive Patrick
Dromgoole.29 In later years, the U.K. would export more television to the United
States than any member state in the European Union.30 The disparity between the
British and French approaches would lead directly to some of the most ineffective
aspects of the Directive.
Italy, like the United Kingdom, passively embraced, if not openly, advocated
a liberal policy. The public broadcaster, RAI, operated three channels in
competition with a relatively large commercial sector comprising around 400
outlets in 21 regional operations. 31 In 1982 the vast majority of Italy's imported
feature films and made-for-television movies-over 77 percent-were American.32
TO DOMINATE WORLD TELEVISION (1998) [hereinafter AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD]. In Holland,
for example, air-time on two stations was divided between various politically and religiously affiliated
broadcasters. Kerry Segrave observes, "In an attempt to warn Dutch viewers of the horrors of
American-style commercial television, the Socialist Station, VARA-TV aired a 'typical day' of
American television fare. It was meant to expose the 'crass commercialism' that could become more
prevalent in Holland in the future..." Id. at 197.
24. Id. at 198.
25. Id
26. Id. at 199.
27. Id. at 199-200.
28. Richard Collins, The European Union Audiovisual Policies of the U.K. and France, in
TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, 198, 198-99 (Michael Scriven
& Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
29. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 202.
30. See Collins, supra note 28 at 206-07.
3 1. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 203.
32. Id. at 205. During 1982, Italy imported 1,827 feature films and made-for-TV movies, 1,418 of
2003
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
By the end of 1982, there were three major commercial networks in operation on a
national scale, two of which were owned by Silvio Berlusconi.33 On the eve of the
Directive, it seemed that Italy typified everything the French had feared. In 1987,
the Italians imported $300 million worth of foreign television programming, 80
percent of which came from the United States, 34 and Berlusconi's stations
broadcast about 62 percent American product.35
The situation in the rest of Europe was much the same. Total U.S. television
exports to Europe in 1987 were about $675 million, or 56 percent of total export
volume.36 In the then 12 European Community nations, at least 25 percent of all
programming hours came from U.S. producers.37 An American market research
company predicted that by the early 1990's that figure would increase to around 40
percent. 38 By 1989 the U. S. generated a stunning total of $1.7 billion in offshore
television sales, much of it destined for Europe.39 In response to the growing
domination of American television programming on European networks and to the
perceived threat this posed to the preservation of European culture, the
Commission issued its first Green paper on the matter in 1984.40 This paper
expressed the basic principles which came to guide formation of the Directive, and
constituted the basis for the first proposal for legislation in 1986. 4 1 The new
proposal advocated the preservation of European culture through the use of a
relatively moderate quota provision requiring only that European broadcasters
reserve 30 percent of their airtime for European works.42 The Council and
Parliament debated the issue for the next three years before finally adopting the
Directive in October of i 989. 43
Ill. BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE.
The Directive addressed three different fields: the protection of minors, the
regulation of advertising, and the protection of European culture through the means
which were from the United States. Id. The next largest competitor for Italy's import market was the
United Kingdom, which exported 133 films to Italy. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 207.
36. Id.
37. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 207.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 263.
40. See generally, Commission of the European Communities, Television Without Frontiers:
Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and
Cable, COM (84) 300 final [hereinafter 1984 Green Paper].
41. Shaun P. O'Connell, Television Without Frontiers: The European Union's Continuing
Struggle for Cultural Survival, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 501, 504 (1996) [hereinafter Continuing
Struggle]; Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation of Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Broadcasting
Activities, 1986 O.J. (C179) 4.
42. See Continuing Struggle, supra note 41 at 504.
43. Id.
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of quotas for the broadcasting of European works.44 Only the quota provisions are
dealt with here. The new legislation was, in some aspects, more stringent than the
Green Paper's initial recommendations, mandating that "broadcasters reserve for
European works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their
transmission time...,,45 Though this was a disappointment to some who had
advocated a more robust 60 percent requirement, it was a marked change from
what legislators, who had witnessed the rapid onslaught in their audiovisual
sectors, had recommended a few years earlier.46 Article 6 laid down what seemed
to be relatively simple guidelines for determining whether a work was of European
origin. In summary, a work satisfied the requirement if it: 1) originated in a
Member State, or 2) originated in other European states who were parties to
previous legislation regulating television broadcasting.47 Furthermore, the works
must either 1) be made by "one or more producers established in one or more of
those States," or 2) "supervised and actually controlled by one or more producers
established in one or more of those States," or 3) "the contribution of co-producers
of those states to the total co-production costs" must be "preponderant," and the
''co-production must not be controlled by one or more producers established
outside those States. '48 Of course, as could be expected, the specifications for
European works would come to be a point of tension in future years.
Two other key aspects of the Directive should be noted. First, article four,
which lays out the basic quota provisions, specifies that quotas should be required
only "where practicable and by appropriate means. '49 This provision has been
criticized for weakening the quota provisions to the point where they are
meaningless. 50 Second, article four allows Member States to exclude broadcast
time for sporting events, news, games, advertising and teletext services from the
airtime to which quotas must be applied.51 This provision has been criticized by
many who feel it allows for the satisfaction of quota requirement by broadcasting
material with little cultural worth.52 Together, the "where practicable language,"
the exemption for news and games, and the difficulty in defining and assuring that
a work is of European origin constitute the major weaknesses of the Directive.
5 3
44. See The Directive, supra note 6 at art. 4-22.
45. Id. at art. 4, 1.
46. Of course, the 50 percent requirement is only a floor, and individual Member States remain
free to establish more rigorous quotas. This is the case in France, which demands that 60 percent of
airtime be reserved for works of European origin.
47. The Directive, supra note 6 at art. 6, I. Section (b) refers to non-member States who are
parties to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television.
48. See ld at art. 6, 2.
49. See Id. at art. 4, .
50. See, e.g., How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2008 (referring to the quota
provisions as "toothless").
5 I. See the Directive, supra note 6 at art. 4,1 1.
52. See e.g., How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2006.
53. Id.
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IV. CULTURAL DOMINANCE THROUGH MEDIA: THE CASE FOR QUOTAS.
From the viewpoint of those who initiated and eventually legislated for the
Directive, it was a necessary response to the rapidly changing dynamics of
broadcast television in Europe during the late 1980's and early 1990's. The
necessity can be understood from two perspectives-one directly resting on
cultural concerns (a view embracing quota provisions more directly as an end in
themselves) and the other incorporating the intermediate assertion that strong
competition from the European audiovisual sector is necessary to stem the influx
of American programming, which will in turn protect European culture (a view
embracing quota provisions more as a means to effectuate a purpose).
Among the underlying assumptions of both perspectives is the view that
media is culture-a fairly uncontroversial proposition. Thomas Bishop, for
example, has argued that "film and television are crucial conveyors of cultural
express-in fact the most widely applied means of transporting a nation's culture
at the end of the twentieth century. 54 More controversial is the implication that
the vectors of cultural influence somehow operate more efficiently moving in the
direction from the media to the broader cultural body. 55 This view emphasizes the
potential threat imposed by the media upon culture rather than understanding the
media as a reflection of culture. Of course, the advocates of quotas would question
whose culture is being reflected, and probably conclude that it is the culture of
America, and not even a very broad sector of that culture. Another question is then
ripe for the asking: if American programming is coming to dominate broadcasting
in Europe, is it because of American cultural imperialism or because Europeans
prefer to view American (or at least American style) programming?
The latter proposition is highly doubtful. Jack Valenti, the former president
of the Motion Picture Association of America has argued that Europeans prefer
American programming, claiming that Europeans "like, admire, and patronize
what we offer them."56 Valenti has further asserted that the European taste for
American programming is evidence of the true motives of the European
Community, claiming, "the E.C. objection [to the dominance of American
audiovisual product] has nothing to do with culture. What it is really about is
commerce. The only way to force citizens not to watch American programs is to
keep those programs off the air.",57 But the converse is probably more accurate: the
only way to force European Union citizens to watch American programs is to keep
them on the air. In 1990, at the height of the perceived cultural crisis, for example,
a London based research firm, CIT concluded, "type for type domestically
produced shows usually received better ratings than U.S. imports."8 Another
study found that "most U.S. material is not suited to a European audience and has
54. Thomas Bishop, France and the Need for Cultural Exception, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
187 (1997).
55. See id.
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weaker ratings than similar domestic fare., 59 There are certainly other forces that
can account for the pervasiveness of American audiovisual product inside the
European Union. 60  More importantly, those forces may account for the
ineffectiveness of the Directive as well. While some of these questions are more
properly addressed in a paper of their own, they are important ones to keep in mind
while assessing the arguments for cultural protectionism, whether they view quotas
as an end point or a starting point.
Perhaps the best embodiment of the case for quotas is found in the French
perspective. Judith Beth Prowda has observed, "France, with the leading film
industry in Europe, has become the self-appointed defender of European culture.'
The French have expressed their wariness of the American cultural invasion
through legislation on other fronts than the audiovisual. The Loi Toubon (1994)
for example effectively banned the use of English (or other language) words in all
official and most commercial contexts, 62 thus attempting to safeguard the French
language, considered by many to be France's greatest cultural resource.63 Inspired
by the Loi Toubon, another regulation went into effect in January of 1996
implementing a 40 percent quota for French songs between the hours of 6:30 AM
and 10:30 PM on French music stations. 64 From the French perspective, the
justification is that without such cultural protectionism, French culture (and in the
context of the Directive, European culture) would wither.65 Indeed, these fears
often seem bolstered by reality. If French protectionism of the audiovisual sector
sometimes appears questionable, it is only fair to remain cognizant of statistics
observed by industry critics like Richard Collins, who notes French author P.
Moeglin's findings that in 1990, "of twelve transnational European television
channels, five transmitted in English," and of "ninety-six national and regional
television channels in the European Community, twenty-four used English, more
than used any other single language." 66
It is important to remember that the French in no way embody the thinking of
all Member States. In countries like Italy and the United Kingdom, the concern is
quite different. These countries are better characterized by saying that they
advocate a system of quotas primarily as a means to protect commercial concerns,
and that cultural protection is the secondary goal, maybe even incidental. Collins
observes, "it would be too neat to state that the U.K. has been the principal
proponent of liberalisation and France the principal opponent... better to say that
59. Id. at 259.
60. Id.
61. Judith Beth Prowda, U.S. Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture" and the French
"Cultural Exception, "29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 199 (1997) [Hereinafter U.S. Dominance].
62. Id. at 206.
63. See id. Toubon himself, for example, explained that "this law is not an attack on English, but
an attempt to preserve this [French] language, this irreplaceable capital. If it is not preserved, it will
die." Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally, id.
66. See Collins, supra note 28 at 212-13.
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the U.K. has gone with the flow of the policies of integration and liberalisation." 67
Collins argues that the U.K.'s tack often coincides with the goals of countries like
Germany and Denmark who sometimes favor liberalization as a counterweight to
what they feel are encroachments on independent liberties and freedom of speech
imposed by creeping E.U. regulation.68 Italy, like the United Kingdom, deregulated
early, 69 and has used a single regulatory body to oversee both broadcasting and
telecommunications, managing a private sector that has often broadcast more
American than European content. In characterizing the stance of countries like the
United Kingdom and Italy, the importance of competitiveness first cannot be
overlooked. Of course, neither can the language factor in the case of the United
Kingdom, which manages to export more programming to America 70 and more
programming to the rest of the European Union than any other Member State.7'
Some have argued that this success is not the result of liberal British regulatory
policies making the British audiovisual sector more competitive, but simply the
fact that Americans are loath to suffer through dubbed or subtitled product 7 2 as
well as the fact that English is widely spoken on the continent.
But there is another persuasive argument for the maintenance of the Directive
that is ostensibly independent of any political or cultural rationale: there is at least
some evidence that it has actually been effective. The terms of the Directive
mandate a periodic report on its effectiveness.73 The report covering the period
between 1997 and 1998 found a significant increase in the broadcast of European
works during this period, and that the major French, German and Italian channels
were broadcasting around 70 percent European content.74
The most recent report, issued in November of 2002 and covering the years
1999-2000, was largely a positive review of the Directive's effectiveness. 75 The
Commission came to four general conclusions. First, the Commission observed
that the total number of channels had increased significantly during the period in
76question. Second, The Commission concluded that, generally, average
transmission time reserved for European works by channels with the highest
viewer ratings grew during the period in question.77 More specifically, the
proportion of European works actually broadcast, in terms of number of channels,
67. See id. at 199.
68. Id.
69. STYLIANOS PAPATHANASSOPOLOUS, EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE: ISSUES,
DYNAMICS AND REALITIES 15 (2002) [hereinafter EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE]. The
United Kingdom actually deregulated in 1954. Though Italy followed some twenty-two years later, no
other country in Europe deregulated until 1982. Id.
70. See Collins, supra note 28 at 206-07.
71. Id.
72. See U.S. Dominance, supra note 61 at 201.
73. See The Directive, supra note 6 at art. 4, 1 6.
74. See EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 18.
75. See generally, November Report of the Commission, supra note 7.
76. See the November Report of the Commission, supra note 7 at 5-6. According to the
Commission, the total number of channels to which articles four and five of the Directive apply
increased from approximately 550 in January of 1999 to around 820 in January of 2001. Id.
77. Id. at 7.
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increased in twelve Member States, remained stable in one, and fell in two.
78
Third, the Commission concluded that the number of Member States achieving the
"majority proportion of their transmission time of European works" was growing
steadily. 79 During the years in question, the average compliance rate among all
European channels in all Member States increased by 3.93 percent.8 0 Finally, the
Commission found that the scheduling (as opposed to actual broadcast) of
European works increased during the period in question in fourteen Member
States.8 1
Taken at face value, the Commission's report would seem to suggest that the
Directive is achieving its goal of at least increasing the amount of European
material broadcast on European air waves, if not the goal of protecting European
culture itself (it is important to keep in mind, after all, that this is the goal
specifically set out in the Directive's preamble).8 2 However, there are some
important qualifications to the data. Most obviously, and perhaps most
significantly, the Commission itself recognizes that the data are incomplete,
explaining that "some Member States still failed to provide full information,
particularly with regard to cable and/or satellite television channels (which are
often omitted from national reports)."8'3 In fact, before discussing most of its
conclusions, the Commissioners felt obligated to reiterate the exclusion from their
evaluation of much information concerning cable and satellite channels. 8 4 Quite
often, the Member States simply omitted these data from their reports to the
Commission. 5 This omission is significant because satellite and cable channels
are arguably the two fastest growing formats for broadcasting8 6; an assessment of
the Directive's effectiveness which focuses on terrestrial broadcasting while
largely ignoring these formats is anachronistic. As we will see, satellite broadcasts
pose particularly difficult challenges to the achievement of the Directive's goals.
At best, the Commission's most recent report glosses over this fact; at worst it is
rendered largely irrelevant by it.
Another important factor in evaluating the Commission's data is the exclusion
of statistics for channels that commanded less than a three percent audience share
during the period in question.8 7 As the number of channels increases dramatically
(an observation made by the Commission itself) the audience share of each channel
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See the November Report of the Commission, supra note 7 at 7.
81. Id.
82. See generally, id.
83. id at 6.
84. See, e.g., The November Report of the Commission, supra note 7 at 23, 25. For example, both
the Commission's "General Considerations" regarding the requirement to broadcast a majority
proportion of European works as it functioned at a national level, and the assessment (at the
community level) of the requirement for broadcasting of works by independent producers are qualified
with the observation that satellite and cable channel data are often simply omitted from the reports of
individual Member States.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id.
87. Seeid. at7, n.14.
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will necessarily diminish. Over time, less data will be involved in the
Commission's assessments. Arguably, the statistics for the 2002 report (which
considered 820 channels) are less reliable than those for the 2000 report (which
considered only 670). Furthermore, should the Directive be amended to apply to
non-traditional media platforms like direct TV and TV on demand (one of the
options currently up for consideration), the exclusion of channels with less than a
three percent audience share will necessarily work to exclude a vast proportion of
the material broadcast inside the European Union.
Furthermore, the report is often simply spun in a direction favorable to the
Commission. Factors the Commission interprets as indicating a slight improvement
can also be interpreted to indicate a negative trend, calling into question their
meaningfulness. For instance, though the conclusions of the Commission are,
broadly speaking, positive concerning the overall compliance rate8 8 (defined as the
percentage of channels achieving or exceeding the majority proportion
requirement"9 ), it should be noted that the country which saw the greatest growth
in number of channels (the United Kingdom 9°) also saw the second lowest growth
in its rate of compliance, which actually fell by two percent. 9' More broadly
speaking, the compliance rate either did not grow or actually decreased during the
period in question in six of the fifteen Member States.92 Taken together, the
incompleteness of the data, its limited nature and its questionable interpretation
cast doubt on the accuracy of any of the Commission's conclusions.
V. MARKET FORCES: THE MAJOR CHALLENGE TO EFFECTIVE CULTURAL
PROTECTIONISM.
There are two implicit positions from which the Directive is advocated: one
embraces a quota system as a direct method of insuring the protection of European
culture, while the other finds that cultural protection is probably best effectuated
by economic means.93 But the proponents of quotas as a method of nurturing the
European audiovisual sector often seem to confuse the legitimacy of the goal of
cultural protection with the means used to achieve that goal. It is difficult to
contradict the assertion that European culture should be acknowledged,
preserved--even revered. The question of whether those goals can be achieved
through the imposition of television broadcast quotas, however, is a murky one at
best. Given the economic forces that shaped the European broadcast environment
in the 1980s and their continued persistence, it seems unlikely.
Of course the question to ask is why, even in countries like France that stands
staunchly opposed to the American television invasion, was American
88. Id. at 41.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. This fact is even more significant when one considers that the United Kingdom produced
19 of the total of 48 new channels produced throughout the E.U. during the period in question. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Growth was static in Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Finland. Growth was negative in
Denmark (-8.6%) and the United Kingdom (-2.0%).
93. See Commerce Versus Culture, supra note 9 at 562-570.
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programming in the 1990's becoming easier and easier to find? Why, despite a 60
percent quota for European Community programming, was its television industry
gradually becoming more and more commercial and typifying all the things it had
feared? Several political and economic forces can be identified which are arguably
the root-cause of the European television transformation. First, the so-called "Iron
Law" of television,94 which dictates that liberalization leads invariably to a flood of
cheap imports.9  As the European broadcast industry deregulated and became
more privatized, newcomers to the marketplace found it difficult to compete with
established broadcasters. More and more they found themselves faced with a
choice of paying astronomical costs for European productions or filling their
airtime with extremely cheap U.S. imports. To stay afloat, they chose the latter
option. Second, the early focus in most European countries on establishing state
broadcasters resulted in a focus on preventing state-monopolies and resultant
abuses of power.97 This can be contrasted with the United States, which was more
concerned with maintaining a competitive economic marketplace.98 That focus
arguably led to an American audiovisual sector that could simply outperform the
Europeans in economic terms. Perhaps most importantly, the audiovisual sector in
Europe (and the United States) is experiencing a wave of concentration that leaves
production in the hands of ever larger conglomerates whose joint ventures with
American interests and increasing need to be competitive ultimately result in
homogeneous or Americanized product. Finally, convergence is operating not just
in economic, but also in technological pathways, forcing regulatory legislation to
adapt or become ineffective.
The key question overlying all of these problems is whether the Directive can
effectively protect European programming from assuming a smaller and smaller
corner of the market. More important and more problematic is the question of
whether it can preserve anything recognizably European in the European
programming that manages to compete successfully with inexpensive American
fare.
A. Economic Realities of Production and Market Entry
It cannot be doubted that the American audiovisual industry, particularly the
television industry, had the good fortune of maturing early. The advanced state of
America's private broadcast sector allowed Hollywood to achieve a sophistication
(at least in economic terms) and efficiency in its production that Europe arguably
still has not managed.99 Raymond Kuhn and James Stayner observe, "For much of
94. See How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2010-11.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Harvey B. Feigenbaum, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Publis Power to Private
Actors: Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1770-
72 (2002) [hereinafter Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries].
98. Id.
99. See Raymond Kuhn & James Stanyer, Television and the State, in TELEVISION
BROADCASTING IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN 2, 2 (Michael Scriven & Monia Lecomte,
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television's history the state [in Britain and France] strictly controlled market
entry, with the result that the growth in the supply of television was slow and
incremental."100 Britain and France were by no means anomalous. One result of
this is that production costs in America compared with those inside the European
Union are startlingly small. In 1986, at the height of the first deregulation phase in
Europe, the average cost of producing a one-hour drama in Europe was around $4
million.'0 ' In the United States it was only $350,000. 102 More to the point, while
newcomers to the private sector like Italy's RAI could spend the $4 million to
develop a new one-hour program with European producers, actors, writers and
directors, they could also opt to purchase a one-hour program from the Americans
for around $12,000.103 Assuming for the sake of argument that Italians didn't care
for American programming, at these prices it didn't matter. RAI could afford
slightly lower ratings if it meant its overall broadcast costs were that much lower.
What it could not afford was to produce European material. Italy was not alone;
the situation was much the same throughout Europe. In 1989 the New York Times
observed, "European television stations can buy rights to an hour-long American
show for less than one-tenth the cost of financing an hour-long domestic
production. '104
In the European film industry, things may be worse. The industry is
important to the television market and therefore important in assessing the
effectiveness of the Directive for at least two reasons. First, film production is
often financed by television broadcasters'0 5 and second, film accounts for a large
proportion of programming on European television stations.3 6  Unfortunately,
between 1970 and 1990 film production slumped from a high of 778 features to
just 500.107 Given the enormous lag in production capabilities between the United
States and the various members of the European Union, it seems fair to assume
these forces will operate, both in film and television, for quite some time.
Kevin McDonald has argued that we can expect more struggle along these
lines in the European audiovisual sector as more and more private, commercial,
and pay-TV channels sprout in the deregulated hothouse of the Union. 108 New
networks, he argues, must invariably purchase the cheaper imports in order to
eds., 1999). While Britain privatized in 1954 with the introduction of Independent Television (ITV),
the effect of introducing one channel was negligible. France, on the other hand, effectively maintained a
state monopoly on broadcasting until the 1980's. Id.
100. Id.
101. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 200-01.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 205.
104. See Steven Greenhouse, The Television Europeans Love and Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 1989, at 24.
105. See generally, Anne Jackel, Broadcasters' Involvement in Cinematographic Co-production, in
TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN 175, 175-96 (Michael Scriven
& Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
106. See generally, id.
107. See How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2009-10.
108. See generally, id.
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compete with the already established networks doing the same thing.'0 9 As the
number of networks increases, programming becomes more expensive, driving
stations to spend more on imports and leaving them with even less for original
production."10 The consequence of all this, of course, is that more American
programming fills more European airtime. The airwaves are full of homogenized
American product and low-quality European product as a result of drained budgets.
This is the so-called "Iron Law" of television, and it results, McDonald argues, in a
cultural uniformity which blots out difference and threatens European language
and identity."'
This is one face of the schizoid European audiovisual policy. As the
marketplace itself moves toward privatization and liberalization, how can the
European Union realistically expect to maintain regulatory policies that move in
the opposite direction? If cheap content is needed and the only source of that
content right now is low-brow American programming, so loathed by the
Commission that it is in many respects out-lawed, then how can European
networks hope to satisfy their quota requirements and remain economically viable?
One answer, ironically, is that European media corporations have become
much more like their American counterparts. Television companies in Europe now
more resemble American corporations than they do their public-model parents.'2
Film production, on the other hand, has increasingly become more of a global
rather than a national endeavor, and is now commonly executed in multiple
countries with multinational crews." 3 Examples of this phenomenon include The
Fifth Element Enemy at the Gates, and The Lord of the Rings." 4 This situation
makes the article six provisions defining what constitutes a European work largely
irrelevant.
Alliances between media companies are beginning to sprout and, argues
Harvey Feigenbaum, are in some ways shaping national cultural policy by
themselves quite successfully."' 5 What is more, the number of these alliances
continues to grow, further weakening the distinction between American and
European works. Examples include Sony pictures, which signed a $60 million
deal with Germany's Babelsberg Studios as well and beleaguered Vivindi, which
now owns Seagram's Universal along with Canal Plus and, since January of 2002,
USA Network's media business." 6 Article six of the Directive aside, cross-
pollination on this scale casts doubt on any attempt to define a European Work.
With American television shows like Big Brother and Survivor selling not
individual episodes but, rather, their bare formats to European producers," 7 even
109. Id at 2010-11.
110. Id
III. Id. at 2011-13.
112. See Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries, supra note 97 at 1776-77.
113. Id.
114. Idat 1779.
115. Id. at 1778.
116. Id. at 1779.
117. Id.
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point systems like those delineated by the European Convention of
Cinematographic Co-production" I8 seem likely to prove ineffective. Would the
political infighting and bickering of an all-European cast on a French island
somewhere in the Mediterranean directed by an Italian and jointly funded by
British and German media conglomerates be a European work? Answering 'yes'
to the question, as one must under the guidelines of the Directive, illustrates the
problem. The Commission might call such works European, but the protection of
European culture is slowly losing meaning as that culture is itself transformed-
partly by economic forces and partly by viewers themselves. Even if programming
itself is not American, in the highly competitive new European audiovisual sectors,
selecting the right programming resembles a more American process, leaving the
average hour of airtime more commercialized and more revenue oriented. It has
become "a central and strategic function for the most part inspired by the
American example: programs [are] designed or purchased in keeping with goals
determined by audience ratings."'"19 This phenomenon is beyond the reach of the
Directive, which makes no distinction between crass American commercialism and
crass European commercialism.
The problems posed by alliances between European and American media
corporations are mirrored internally by the problems posed by convergence within
The European Union's audiovisual sector. More and more, programming diversity
is being sacrificed for streamlined competitiveness among the shrinking number of
media corporations. Again, the effect is to give Europeans a more American-
looking product. Media conglomerates based inside the European Union are faced
with the additional difficulty of translating their products across multiple language
barriers. The result is often an end product that favors action over plot and
movement over dialogue. The other alternative is to favor English, which, though
spoken widely, effectively alienates non-English speakers and countries like
France who view the provisions of the Directive as one of the key tools in their
arsenal to protect their own language.
Merger activity in the sector is widespread and occurs on a significant
economic scale. In 1996, for example, German media giant Bertlesmann merged
with Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Td61diffusion (CLT) to form CLT-Ufa,
which came to dominate the German audiovisual marketplace.' 20 The first half of
2000 saw merger activity of around $35 billion with notable deals including the
merger of CLT-Ufa with Pearson TV, ProSieben with Satl in Germany, and the
takeover of Dutch production company Endemol Entertainment by Telefonica.1
2 1
Other mergers included Kirch (Germany) with BSkyB (United Kingdom), which
18. See Council of Europe, European Convention on Cinematographic Co-Production (ETS No.
147) at appendix II. This provision of the Convention awards points for various European elements of a
production, requiring a minimum point total in order for the work to satisfy the definition of a European
co-production.
119. Regine Chaniac, Two Programming Models, in TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN
CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN 58-70, 59 (Michael Scriven & Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
120. EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 107.
121. Id. at 108.
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was cleared by the European Commission in March of 2000,122 and the takeover of
Canalsatellite Numdrique in France by Canal Plus and Lagard~re in June of the
same year. 1
23
In January of 2002, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to a
strengthened audiovisual sector, explaining that the media "constitutes not only an
expression of creativity, particularly of identities, and a fundamental means of
promoting democracy, but also an economic activity of growing importance,"' 124 a
statement which captures the two conflicting influences at work within the Union
and the audiovisual sector. From one perspective, the Commission is charged with
eliminating barriers to competition within the Economic Community. From
another, it often assumes responsibility for safeguarding the cultural heritage of the
European Union. In purely economic terms, this has translated into the situation
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos has observed: "The Commission, on the one hand,
favours mergers, acquisitions and the creation of joint ventures to provide new
television (notably pay-TV) services," he argues, "and, on the other, examines
whether these moves can eliminate competition. This is not an easy task, since the
one goal contradicts the other."'125 Furthermore, it seems unlikely, in the face of
piecemeal regulation, that the Commission can do much to stop the decline in the
number of competitors. "In short," argues Papathanassopoulos, "the European
Union seems powerless to regulate the issue of concentration, apart from
scrutinizing the mergers and acquisitions under the competition law."' 126 While the
Directive is not intended to regulate competition or insure that mergers and
acquisitions occur in a democratic fashion, it is unquestionable that the
effectiveness of the Directive is impacted by the trend of convergence.
B. Technological Complications.
There is an impact not only from convergence in the traditional sense, but also
from technological convergence, both in terms of service and content. From the
service angle, companies that previously operated exclusively in one form of
media are expanding their activities into new media realms. Cable companies are
providing telecommunications service and Internet access, while Internet service
providers are delving into the traditional territory of the television broadcaster,
offering services like TV on demand and web TV.' Patrick Vittet-Philippe
argues, "functioning traditionally on separate markets, these players are now
increasingly encroaching on each other's turf. In all cases, these new services are
122. See Commission Decision of 21/03/2000 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the
Common Market (Case no IVM.0037-*/*** B SKY B/KIRCH PAY TV) according to Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 2000 O.J. (C 110).
123. See EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 122.
124. See Council Resolution of 21 January 2002 on the Development of the Audiovisual Sector,
a, 2002 O.J. (C 032).
125. See EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 117.
126. Id. at 115.
127. See Patrick Vittet-Philippe, Beyond Digital Television, in TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN
CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, 120, 124-25 (Michael Scriven & Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
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considered a strategic extension of core competence and a crucial source of
revenues in the years to come."' 28 Some commentators suggest that the traditional
European television market will soon face stiff competition from entertainment
offered over the web. 29 The response from European media corporations like
Canal Plus is to offera so-called digital multimedia broadcasting as a cheap means
to implement broadband distribution of video and high-speed data. 30
From the content angle, these companies are not just shaping how media is
consumed, but what media is consumed. One way this is happening is through the
development of interactive television scenarios which essentially combine browser
like features with television style content.13' The opposite approach is being taken
by computer-based media companies offering video through the Internet. 32 Both
scenarios not only provide access to content, but actually shape content according
to the medium through which it is offered.
These new 'broadcast platforms' provide a particularly vexing problem for
legislation aimed at cultural protection. As it is, the Directive does not directly
address any quota for European content on cross-media platforms. From a
practical standpoint, how could such regulation ever be effective? Furthermore,
there are other complicating factors such as the difficulty in regulating satellite
broadcasts. Kerry Segrave's observation that "it will become very difficult if not
impossible, to police the reception of satellite television ,133 might just as well be
applied to the other new media platforms currently being developed by companies
like Canal and MSNBC. The Commission's observation that even now many
Member States do not provide complete data on satellite transmissions for
purposes of assessing the Directive's effectiveness is a foreshadowing of
difficulties to come. The basic problem is fairly simple: as more audiovisual
consumption is carried out in the realm beyond terrestrial television, the
Directive's focus must move into that realm or the Directive itself will become
increasingly irrelevant.
This is one of the larger problems the European Union faces as it begins to
debate possible changes to the Directive in the coming months. One option is to
leave things as they are and possibly attempt other regulation aimed at the new
media. Currently, when consumers watch programming that must be downloaded,
like that available from video-on-demand and mobile video service, they are
considered to be in a regulation free zone. 34 Another option is to extend the
Directive so that it applies to all networks whether they broadcast by traditional
means, satellite, or via some kind of new media platform. While this sounds
attractive, its implementation could take years, during which time further
technological complications will undoubtedly force another reconsideration of the
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 125.
131. See id. at 124-25.
132. Id.
133. AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 249.
134. See A Closer Watch on All Channels, supra note 8.
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effectiveness of the legislation. Given the inevitable lag between technological
innovation and legislative response, it seems reasonable to suppose a
corresponding lag between legislative response and effective legislative response.
The problem casts doubt on the ability of any quota system, however broadly
applied, to effectively dictate European content.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arguably, in heralding the death of the Franco-French cultural exception Jean
Marie-Messier was doing nothing more than reporting on the state of the
audiovisual marketplace. A policy that attempted to exclude audiovisual products
from the constraints of GATT and WTO efforts at free trade-a policy that
justified a quota regime on grounds that they applied to cultural services rather
than economic products-seems to make little sense in the current climate. The
Commission seems to favor concentration in the audiovisual sector in the hope that
it will create a more competitive industry within the Union. Ironically, the very
policies designed to enhance the cultural content of European airwaves are now
working as a barrier to companies seeking to become more competitive. As
European audiovisual companies try to enhance their market share, they
increasingly find they must do so by crossing borders to form alliances with other
companies. Yet this is increasingly difficult in light of the Directive's provisions.
As Vivindi, for example, acquired its interest in USA Networks, the old forces of
cultural protectionism swept in to hamper the process. On the one hand, the
European Union embraces a more competitive audiovisual sector as a means to
protect European culture. On the other, the Directive, with its quotas and
definitions of what constitutes European works, makes it difficult for the
audiovisual sector to form the alliances it must in order to reach parity with the
Hollywood machine.
More importantly, convergence within the audiovisual sector is leading to a
loss of plurality and a homogeneity of exactly the sort feared by the innovators of
the Directive. European culture is not simply threatened by external forces, but is
susceptible to erosion from within as well-a process that the Directive is
powerless to deal with. While the Commission's 2002 report on the effectiveness
of the Directive, might support the bare conclusion that more European works are
being broadcast inside the Member States (a conclusion with which it is easy to
take exception), it cannot refute the fact that the quality of that programming is
changing-probably for the worse. European culture, never a well-defined
concept to begin with, is becoming the culture of those Member States who have
the most competitive media corporations-France, the United Kingdom, and
Germany. After the Union's recent expansion, it is particularly appropriate to
question whether the American cultural imperialism of the 1980s and 1990s will
look any different from the coming culture clash between the comparatively well-
developed audiovisual sectors of Western Europe and the embryonic sectors of the
new Member States.
Finally, convergence in the technological realm continues to effect both the
context and content of media consumption inside the European Union. Regulation
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in this realm is virtually nonexistent now and, at best, can hope only to lag
significantly far behind the pace of change. As more and more consumers turn to
media platforms outside the traditional television broadcast scenario, the Directive
will come to resemble the flailing of a traffic cop in a deserted parking lot. The
effectiveness of the Directive must be evaluated independently of any claims to the
success of its individual provisions. It must be evaluated on the basis of whether
or not it can succeed at the goal set forth in its preamble-the protection of
European culture. In light of the difficulties set forth above, this seems doubtful.
UPDATE
In December 2003, the Commission Published The Future of European
Regulatory Audiovisual Policy, 35 a communication from the Commission to the
Council and other EU governing bodies describing recent changes in the European
audiovisual marketplace and conglomerating the findings of the Fourth Report on
the Application of the Directive 36 as well as the European Parlaiment's recent
"Report on Television without Frontiers."'137 The Commission has concluded, "the
Directive is generally being applied satisfactorily, the free movement of television
broadcasting services within the Community having essentially been insured.' 38
However, public comment on the Directive during 2003 highlighted some
shortcomings in the legislation. While the Commission found that broadband
services and satellite technology have been adopted more slowly than first
expected, it also explained that "a thorough revision of the Directive might be
necessary to take account of technological developments and changes in the
structure of the audiovisual market."'
' 39
As the Commission reports, most of the parties commenting on the Directive
favored no changes to the legislation, though a minority advised strengthening its
provisions. The most frequent recommendations from those questioning the
Directive's effectiveness were to introduce "an explicit quantitative objective
[ranging from 51 percent to 75 percent] instead of the expression 'a majority
proportion of its transmission time," and "clarifying the obligation by deleting the
135. Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; The Future of European
Regulatory Audiovisual Policy, COM(03)784 final. [herinafter The Future of European Regulatory
Audiovisual Policy].
136. COM(03)778 final. This "fourth report" should not be confused with the "Fifth
Communication From the Commission to the Council and the Eruopean Parlaiment on the Application
of Articles Four and Five of Directive 89/552/EEC," supra note 7. The "fourth report" deals with the
Directive as a whole, while the "Fifth Communication" addresses only articles four and five. The fourth
report of the Commission essentially established a schedule for continued public meetings and
discussion throughout 2003. The Future of European Regulatory Policy is an attempt to summarize
these reports and public discussions.
137. Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport, Report on Television without
Frontiers, EUR. PARL. DOC. (A5-0251/2003).
138. The Future of European Regulatory Policy, COM(03)778 final at 6.
139. Id. at 14.
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wording 'Where practicable and by appropriate means."' 140  In the end, the
Commission decided to order further independent studies and scheduled focus
groups to meet in 2004.141
The fallout from Jean-Marie Messier's tenure as Vivendi chief continues. In
September of 2003, General Electric's NBC announced it was entering into
exclusive negotiations with Vivendi Universal in order to precipitate a merger
between the two firms.' 4 2  On October 8th, General Electric reached a final
agreement to acquire Vivendi's assets. 143 The new entity, NBC Universal, will be
80% owned by General Electric with Vivendi retaining the remainder of company
assets. Vivendi investors are to receive $3.8 billion in cash through the issuance of
about 125 million shares in G.E. stock, and G.E. will take on $1.7 billion in
Vivendi debt. The total value of the new enterprise is estimated at $43 billion.
14
The FTC continues to review the merger, while the European Union, invoking its
abbreviated merger analysis after concluding that the deal would have little effect
on its markets, has already approved the action.1
45
140. Id. at 17.
14 1. Id. at 24-25.
142. See generally, John Tagliabue, Vivendi Posts Twenty Percent Rise in Operating Profit for
First Half, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003 at WI.
143. See generally, Bill Carter, G.E. Finishes Vivendi Deal, Expanding Its Media Assets, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003 at Cl.
144. Id.
145. See Prior Notification of a Concentration (Case COMP/M.3303-GEfVivendi Universal
Entertainment), 2003 O.J. (C285) 26; Commission Notice on a Simplified Procedure for Treatment of
Certain Concentrations under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (C 217), 29.7.2000;
see also, EU Regulators Clear NBC-Vivendi Deal, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003 at Al. The EU's
simplified antitrust procedure "clears mergers or acquisitions after one month if no objections are raised
by third parties." Id. See also, Meredith Amdur, EU Clears GE-Viv U Deal: Sale has only limited
impact on Euro film and TV, VARIETY, Dec. 21, 2003.
2003

